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Cooperation is crucial for the success of social interactions.
Given its importance, humans should readily be able to use
available cues to predict how likely others are to cooperate.
Here, we review the empirical literature on how accurate such
predictions are. To this end, we distinguish between three
classes of cues: behavioral (including past decisions), per-
sonal (including gender, attractiveness, and group member-
ship) and situational (including the benefits to cooperation and
the ability to communicate with each other). We discuss (i) how
each cue correlates with future cooperative decisions and (ii)
whether people correctly anticipate each cue’s predictive
value. We find that people are fairly accurate in interpreting
behavioral and situational cues. However, they often misper-
ceive the value of personal cues.
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When people cooperate, they make an individual effort to
benefit others [1]. Such voluntary acts of costly cooper-
ation are crucial for most social interactions, affecting the
well-being of families, the success of scientific collabo-
rations, and the output of team work. Cooperative
behavior can be explored from various angles. Theoretical
studies analyze which social environments are most
conducive to cooperation [2e4]. Similarly, experimental
work explores under which conditions people actually
cooperate and how they adapt their own behavior to thewww.sciencedirect.comactual or expected behavior of their peers [5e8]. Here,
we review this literature, focusing on the following two
questions: how do people use available cues to predict
the cooperativeness of their interaction partners ahead of
an interaction, and which cues are most reliable for
predicting cooperativeness?
We distinguish between three broad categories of cues
that may be used to make such predictions. (i) Behav-
ioral cues refer to the interaction partners’ past actions.
Examples of such cues include whether these partners
cooperated on previous occasions or whether they
enforced cooperative social norms. (ii) Personal attributes
comprise, for example, the interaction partner’s
gender or perceived attractiveness, among other char-
acteristics. (iii) Situational cues define the environment in
which the individual’s next interaction takes place,
including how costly cooperation will be and whether
pre-play communication is possible. For each of the
three categories, we ask whether the given cue is in fact
a reliable predictor of cooperativeness and whether
people judge the cue’s predictive value accurately.
Although the existing literature covers a wide range of
relevant cues, there also exist notable gaps in the liter-
ature, which we encourage scholars to explore further.
There are various ways to elicit how individuals perceive
each other’s cooperativeness. For the purpose of this
review, we consider evidence from three approaches.
The first approach is to elicit perceived cooperativeness
directly by asking participants to estimate how likely
others will cooperate. The two other approaches are
more indirect by either asking participants to choose a
group member for future interactions (i.e. partner
selection) or by asking participants how much money
they would transfer to the respective group member in a
trust game [9]. Our assumption is that the more in-
clined a participant is to choose an interaction partner or
to transfer more money to a partner, with whom they will
interact in the future, the more cooperative they
perceive the partner to bedand indeed, some empirical
work has found this to be the case [10].Behavioral cues of cooperativeness
Perhaps the most immediate cue to predict future
cooperative behavior is whether, and how often, the
respective individual cooperated in the past. Experi-
mental research suggests that people exhibit a stable
and consistent ‘cooperative phenotype’: an individual’sCurrent Opinion in Psychology 2022, 43:151–155
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that individual will subsequently do in different games
[11,12]. Participants in laboratory experiments, in turn,
seem to expect others to be consistent in their cooper-
ative behavior. When people need to choose an inter-
action partner, they strongly prefer partners who have
been cooperative in the past [13]. Similar evidence
comes from studies on charitable giving and pro-
environment behavior. Donors to charity are trusted
more as well as chosen more often as interaction part-
ners, and in many cases, they indeed turn out to be more
cooperative in subsequent social dilemmas [14,15]; but
see also [16].
Anotherdmore indirectd cue of cooperative behavior is
whether individuals previously engaged in the enforce-
ment of social norms. As per this account, people who
punish selfishness may signal that they are not selfish. To
test this hypothesis, Jordan et al. [17] consider an inter-
action that consists of two stages. In the first stage, a
‘signaler’ witnesses a transgressor who refuses to help a
recipient.The signaler can thendecidewhether to engage
in third-party punishment by reducing the payoff of the
transgressor. In the second stage, a ‘chooser’ decides how
much money to send to the signaler in a trust game. The
experiment shows that signalers who punish transgressors
are indeed entrustedwithmoremoney, which turns out to
be justified: these signalers also returnmoremoney to the
chooser. Interestingly, when in the first stage signalers
have a choice between punishing the transgressor or
helping the recipient, signalers are less likely to punish.
Instead, helping turns out to be the more frequently
chosen (and more accurate) signal of trustworthiness.
This result is in line with an earlier experiment reported
by Rockenbach and Milinski [18]: when individuals need
to choosegroupmembers for a cooperative task, theyplace
more weight on how often group members cooperated,
rather than how often they enforced cooperation. Overall,
punishment may not necessarily be taken as a cue of
altruism, as it may also imply aggressiveness. As a result,
punishment is judged more appropriate if it is imple-
mented by the entire group, rather than by a single indi-
vidual [19].
Finally, another potential cue may come from how a
person makes cooperative decisions. For example, based
on a game-theoretic model, Hoffman et al. [20] suggest
that people who collect additional information to care-
fully compare the advantages and disadvantages of a
cooperative decision are considered less reliable and less
cooperative. As per this account, people who deliberately
refuse to learn payoff-relevant information may seem
more committed to cooperation even when defection
happens to be profitable. In line with this view, Jordan
et al. [21] show that study participants who ignore the
precise costs of cooperation are indeed (and accurately)
predicted to be more trustworthy. Participants in turn
seemed to be well-aware of the reputational benefit ofCurrent Opinion in Psychology 2022, 43:151–155strategic ignorance: when the cooperation costs can be
learnt secretly, participants were more likely to do so.
Similar evidence comes from a study reported by Levine
et al. [22] who compare the reputational consequences of
emotion-based versus reason-based decision-making.
Players who state having made a decision based on
emotion are perceived as more cooperative by their
partner and indeed turn out to be more cooperative.
Interestingly, however, players who state having used
reason were not perceived as any less cooperative than a
control group.Personal cues of cooperativeness
A second category of cues pertains to personal charac-
teristics of individuals. The idea that visible character-
istics are used as signals of cooperativeness has its roots
in evolutionary biology: computer simulations and game-
theoretic models suggest that individuals can use visible
cues to identify potential cooperation partners. This
theoretical work suggests that partner choice based on
visible cues can in turn be an important mechanism for
the evolution of cooperation [23].
Arguably, one of the most salient personal cues is gender.
Although some scholars document gender differences in
cooperativeness in the dictator game [24] and the
prisoner’s dilemma [25], the literature remains notori-
ously mixed [26e28]. Indeed, Exley et al. [29] show
that gender only inconsistently predicts cooperativeness
across seven economic games. Nevertheless, across all
economic games, they find robust evidence that people
consistently believe that women are expected to be
fairer, more generous, and more cooperative than men,
in line with studies reported by Aguiar et al. [30] and
Brañas-Garza et al.[31].
Other cues about a person include their physical
appearance, such as an interaction partner’s face and
facial expressions [32e34], their voice [35] and, in
particular, their attractiveness [36,37]. Although there is
no evidence that attractiveness is a reliable predictor of
cooperativeness, good looks nonetheless positively
impact people’s perception of others in many domains of
economic life, known as the ‘beauty premium’ [38].
Indeed, Anderoni and Petrie [36] and Wilson and Eckel
[37] find that people expect more cooperation and
reciprocation from attractive partners. Interestingly,
when such expectations are not met, attractive inter-
action partners incur a ‘beauty penalty,’ receiving less
reciprocation than less attractive players.
Another factor that may affect a partner’s cooperative-
ness is wealth. Here, the experimental evidence remains
inconclusive. For example, Piff et al. [39] find that
subjects who consider their own socioeconomic rank to
be low tend to be more generous and charitable. In
contrast, Smeets et al. [40] report that millionaires arewww.sciencedirect.com
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participants, especially if they are paired with a low-
income partner. A similarly conflicting picture emerges
on the level of perceived cooperativeness. Some exper-
iments find that wealthy participants are perceived to be
more trustworthy and cooperative [41,42], while at the
same time, people seem to systematically underesti-
mate the generosity of the extremely rich [43].
A person’s political, religious, or ethical convictions can
also serve as potential cues of cooperativeness. Research
on political affiliation finds that left-leaning participants
tend to cooperate more than right-leaning participants.
However, the effect is small at best [44,45], and it
seems to be moderated by the fact that left-leaning
participants expect more cooperation from others [46].
Political ideology in turn shapes how people are
perceived. Balliet et al. [47] find that among United
States participants, Democrats are perceived as more
cooperative by both sides of the political spectrum, even
though this belief is inaccurate. Similar to political
ideology, religiosity appears to be correlated with
prosocial behavior [48,49]. As a result, when Christians
show overt religious cues (e.g. a necklace with a cross),
they are perceived as more trustworthy [50]. Finally,
people are considered more trustworthy when they
make deontological rather than consequentialist judg-
ments [51,52]. Interestingly, however, deontological
participants are not necessarily more cooperative [53].
More often than not, when it comes to social attributes,
perceptions of cooperativeness are partially shaped by
in-group bias, as group membership is itself an impor-
tant cue. A large literature demonstrates that partici-
pants cooperate more with, and preferentially reward,
‘in-group’ members, both in the laboratory [54] and in
the field [55]. Democrats and Republicans both tend to
cooperate more with in-group members [47], and par-
ticipants cooperate more with a partner that shares their
nationality [56]. However, group membership may
largely serve as a coordination device: although partici-
pants do not believe that in-group members are intrin-
sically more cooperative than others, Balliet et al
[57] find that more cooperation is expected from in-
group members.Situational cues of cooperativeness
Our final category of cues covers situational aspects
surrounding a cooperative decision. These include fac-
tors outside an individual’s control that are often
determined by the structure or context of the interac-
tion. For example, some social interactions create more
mutual benefits to the participants than others. In lab-
oratory studies, these factors can be studied in isolation,
holding everything else constant. For instance, in the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma, people tend to be more
cooperative when the mutual benefit of cooperationwww.sciencedirect.comincreases [58]. This is consistent with evidence from a
study reported by Charness et al. [59]: as the mutual
benefit of cooperation increases, participants also expect
to see more cooperativeness, especially those partici-
pants who later choose to cooperate. This suggests that
individuals are able to ‘read’ a situation and that they
adjust their willingness to cooperate accordingly.
There has been a debate on whether cooperativeness is
affected by whether or not decisions need to be made
under time pressure. One account holds that when in-
dividuals are forced to decide quickly, they tend to be
more cooperative [60]. However, the causal evidence is
mixed [61]. Alternatively, it has been argued that fast
decisions may not necessarily result in more coopera-
tion. Instead, it may result in more extreme outcomes,
either toward cooperation or defection [62]. This is also
what participants themselves seem to expect: when
asked to predict the outcome of a fast cooperation de-
cision, participants are more likely to expect an extreme
(but not necessarily a cooperative) outcome [63].
Finally, communication has long been found to enhance
cooperation [64]. However, there is debate as to what is
the precise mechanism that allows communication to be
favorable. He et al. [65] rule out several potential ex-
planations, namely, that communication reduces social
distance or that it offers opportunities to make prom-
ises. Instead, they argue that most importantly,
communication allows people to recognize the other
person as a cooperative type. Indeed, Sparks et al
[66] find that people can accurately predict cooperative
behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma after only a short in-
person interaction, even when participants do not
discuss the game itself.Conclusion and future directions
People are quick to form an impression, sometimes in
just a few milliseconds [32], but these impressions do
not need to be reliable. In this review, we have sum-
marized how individuals perceive different cues to
predict others’ cooperativeness. Among the three cate-
gories of cues we considered, people most accurately use
behavioral and situational cues to predict future coop-
erative behavior. In contrast, predictions seem to be
least accurate when they are based on personal attri-
butes. In fact, with the possible exception of political
affiliation and religiosity, personal attributes are often
not a good predictor of actual cooperation behavior, yet
many such attributes d such as gender and attractive-
ness d are nonetheless (and inaccurately) perceived as
predictors of cooperativeness.
These findings raise a number of interesting questions.
For example, theoretical work could explore which kinds
of environments and cues allow people to form reliable
expectations. Similarly, experimental work couldCurrent Opinion in Psychology 2022, 43:151–155
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are and whether they disappear with more experience.
Although we summarized results on a number of
different cues, several others seem to have received
limited attention, including age and ethnicity.
Further interesting problems arise when several
(possibly conflicting) cues are available or when people
need to aggregate cues from different domains. For
example, Kumar et al. [56] show that when people learn
both their interaction partner’s nationality and gender,
the former cue becomes dominant: people cooperate
more with own nationality partners, and they expect
own nationality partners to be more cooperative.
More generally, any given cue seems to become less
relevant once more salient informationd such as actual
cooperative behavior d is available [17,36,67,68].
These findings suggest that people rank different cues
according to each cue’s predictive value. They only
make use of unreliable cues when no other cues are
available.Conflict of interest statement
Nothing declared.
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